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Torts
By RICHARD AUSNESS*
INTRODUCTION
This issue of the Survey includes recent decisions on false
imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
products liability. The first case, Consolidated Sales Co. v.
Malone,' held that Kentucky's shoplifter detention statute au-
thorized a personal search of suspected shoplifters by store
personnel. In the second case, Eigelbach v. Watts,2 the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court adhered to its longstanding rule that
physical impact was essential to an action for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. Finally, in the third decision,
McMichael v. American Red Cross,3 the Court, utilizing the
Restatement's "unavoidably unsafe"4 rationale, refused to
impose strict liability in tort on a noncommerical blood bank
which supplied contaminated blood to a transfusion patient.
I. FALSE IMPRISONMENT
Consolidated Sales Co. v. Malone,5 was an action for false
imprisonment which arose after the plaintiff's detention and
search as a suspected shoplifter by employees of the Consoli-
dated Sales Company. The trial court granted a directed ver-
dict for the plaintiff on liability and authorized the jury to
award punitive damages if it found that the action and attitude
of Consolidated's employees "indicated a wanton and wilful
disregard of the rights of others, including the plaintiff. .... I
The jury awarded Mrs. Malone $1,000 in compensatory dam-
ages and $2,500 in punitive damages. The Kentucky Supreme
Court reversed. In holding that the search was reasonable, the
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1966, J.D. 1968, University of
Florida; LL.M. 1973, Yale University.
1 530 S.W.2d 680 (Ky. 1975).
2 No. 74-336 (Ky., Feb. 20, 1976) (per curiam).
532 S.W.2d 7 (Ky. 1975).
IRESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATEMENT].
5 530 S.W.2d 680 (Ky. 1975).
9 Id.
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Court relied on Kentucky Revised Statutes [hereinafter cited
as KRS] § 433.236(1), which declares:
A peace officer, security agent of a merchantile establish-
ment, merchant or merchant's employee who has probable
cause for believing that goods held for sale by the merchant
have been unlawfully taken by a person, and that he can
recover same by taking the person into custody, may, for the
purpose of attempting to effect recovery, take the person into
custody and detain him in a reasonable manner for a reasona-
ble length of time.
This statute, like those of other states,7 was designed to protect
merchants against tort liability arising out of their efforts to
recover property from suspected shoplifters.
A. Common-Law Liability Rules
At common law the merchant who unlawfully detained a
suspected shoplifter could be held liable for false imprisonment
or false arrest. False imprisonment is the unlawful restraint of
another's physical liberty by means of force or the threat of
force.' One who accomplishes this restraint through the im-
proper assertion of legal authority, on the other hand, is guilty
of false arrest.' Many states do not distinguish between false
arrest and false imprisonment, or use the terms interchange-
ably.'0 In either case, the victim can recover damages for loss
of time, physical discomfort or injury, emotional distress, hu-
miliation, and injury to reputation." Nominal damages may be
recovered if the plaintiff has suffered no actual damages,' 2 and
See infra note 41.
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Billyps, 69 S.W.2d 5 (Ky. 1934); Gust v. Montgo-
mery Ward & Co., 136 S.W.2d 94 (Mo. App. 1939); 32 AM. Jur. 2D False Imprisonment
§ 58 (1967). However, there is no false imprisonment when the plaintiff voluntarily
submits to the restraint. White v. Levy Bros., 306 S.W.2d 829 (Ky. 1957). Moreover,
the restraint must be total, with no reasonable means of escape available. Crew-Beggs
Dry Goods Co. v. Bayle, 51 P.2d 1026 (Colo. 1935); Halliburton-Abbott Co. v. Hodge,
44 P.2d 122 (Okla. 1935).
1 Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 643, 649 (1952).
10 Hammargren v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 241 P.2d 1192 (Kan. 1952); Montgo-
mery Ward & Co. v. Wickline, 50 S.E.2d 387 (Va. 1948).
" S.H. Kress & Co. v. Powell, 180 So. 757 (Fla. 1938); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.
v. Smith, 136 S.W.2d 759 (Ky. 1940); W.T. Grant Co. v. Owens, 141 S.E. 860 (Va.
1928).
'2 See Comment, 17 S.C.L. Rnv. 729, 730 (1965).
[Vol. 65
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in aggravated cases, the jury may impose punitive damages.'
Formerly, to avoid liability for detaining a suspected
shoplifter, a merchant either had to claim defense or recapture
of property, or assert that he had made a valid arrest. Defense
of property was the broadest of these privileges. One in posses-
sion of real or personal property could defend it by the use of
such force as reasonably appeared necessary to prevent a
threatened interference with possession. 4 Although a reasona-
ble mistake as to the necessity for asserting the defense was
permitted,'5 the possessor could not use force to defend the
property against one who had a better right to it, and a mistake
as to the privilege of the intruder was no defense if the possessor
resisted with force,'6 except where the intruder was intention-
ally or negligently responsible for the mistake.
7
Defense of property was seldom appropriate when goods
were displayed so that customers could freely examine them.
Having voluntarily surrendered possession of an article, the
merchant was forced to rely on the recovery of property privi-
lege when the customer kept the merchandise without paying
for it.' Recovery of property was a more limited privilege than
that of defending possession:'9 the rightful owner had to be in
possession; the property must have been taken either forcibly,
fraudulently, or without claim of right; the rightful owner had
to be entitled to immediate possession; the rightful owner had
to make a request for return of the goods unless it would be
useless or dangerous to do so; and the force used could not be
excessive."0 In addition, the privilege was limited to situations
where the owner promptly discovered the loss and made
prompt and persistent efforts to recover the goods.2' In the
absence of such "fresh pursuit" the owner was limited to a
'1 Parrott v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 217 P.2d 89 (Cal. App.
1950); Sternberg v. Hogg, 72 S.W.2d 421 (Ky. 1934).
" RESTATEMENT § 377.
,5 Smith v. Delery, 114 So. 2d 857 (La. 1959).
" Arlowski v. Foglio, 135 A. 397 (Conn. 1926).
,7 Leach v. Francis, 41 Vt. 670 (1868).
" Comment, Shoplifting: Protection for Merchants in Wisconsin, 57 MARQ. L.
REV. 141, 142-43 (1973).
1, RESTATEMENT § 101.
2, Note, The Right of Recaption of Chattels by Force, 34 Ky. L.J. 65, 66 (1945).
21 RESTATEMENT § 103.
1976]
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remedy at law.22 Moreover, one who used force to recover prop-
erty acted at his peril and was liable for any mistake;2 there-
fore, a merchant who detained a suspected shoplifter was not
privileged if the customer had not actually taken something. 2
As a practical matter courts often ignored defense or recov-
ery of property considerations and applied the rules of arrest
where a merchant detained a suspect.25 Because there was sel-
dom time to obtain a warrant in such cases, however, it was
difficult for a merchant to make a valid arrest.2 1 In most states
a private citizen could make an arrest for a felony only if the
arrested person had actually committed a serious crime and
could make an arrest for a misdemeanor only if the crime was
committed in his presence and constituted a breach of the
peace.27 Since most shoplifting was neither a felony nor a
breach of the peace, 2 a merchant often could not validly arrest
a suspected shoplifter at all.3" Moreover, if the shoplifter re-
turned the stolen merchandise, the recovery of property privi-
lege was no longer applicable, and the merchant was liable for
false arrest or false imprisonment if he continued to detain the
suspect. In addition, the burden of proof was upon the mer-
chant to show that the arrest was valid," and probable cause
alone would not justify an arrest. 32 Police officers had some-
what broader powers to arrest without a warrant,33 but a pri-
22 Bobb v. Bosworth, 16 Ky. 81 (1808).
2 Comment, "Shoplifters" Beware? Detention of Suspected Shoplifters, 11 DRAKE
L. REV. 31, 34 (1961).
24 Comment, The Protection and Recapture of Merchandise from Shoplifters, 46
ILL. L. REv. 887, 892 (1952).
2 Note, Shoplifting-An Analysis of Legal Controls, 32 IND. L.J. 20, 24 (1956).
" Id. at 26.
2 RESTATEMENT § 119; see generally Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 IowA L. REv.
201 (1940); Waite, The Law of Arrest, 24 TEx. L. REv. 279 (1946); Note, The Law of
Citizens's Arrest, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 502 (1965).
2M. FRANKLIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND ALTERNATvES 389 (1971).
23 Radloff v. Nat'l Food Stores, Inc., 121 N.W.2d 865 (Wis. 1963). The
RESTATEMENT § 116 defines breach of the peace as "a public offense done by violence,
or one causing or likely to cause an immediate disturbance of public order." But see
Branston, The Forcible Recaption of Chattels, 28 L.Q. REv. 262 (1912).
31 See Note, Shoplifting and the Law of Arrest: The Merchant's Dilemma, 62 YALE
L.J. 788, 799 (1953).
3, Comment, supra note 23, at 35.
"2 Comment, 50 N.C.L. REv. 188, 189 (1971).
3At common law an officer may arrest without warrant for a felony committed
in his presence or when a felony has in fact been committed and he has reasonable
[Vol. 65
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vate person who directed an officer to make an arrest could be
held liable for false arrest if he were mistaken, even though the
officer was protected.3 4 Consequently, merchants often allowed
a suspected shoplifter to leave with stolen goods rather than
risk a suit for false arrest or false imprisonment that might
result if they attempted to recover their property.3 5
Eventually, the courts and legislatures of many states
modified the common law rules to provide greater protection
for merchants in these circumstances. Collyer v. S.H. Kress
Co.,3" decided in 1936, first recognized a shopkeeper's privilege
to detain a suspected shoplifter. The plaintiff in Collyer was
suspected of stealing after several store employees saw him put
articles in his pocket. Although he was detained by store per-
sonnel for about 20 minutes until the police arrived and ar-
rested him, the California Supreme Court held that this deten-
tion was not false imprisonment because the store had probable
cause for believing that the plaintiff had unlawfully taken its
property.37
The Collyer approach was later approved by the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts,38 under which the merchant may tem-
porarily detain in order to investigate the possibility of shop-
lifting.39 The drafters of the Restatement expressed no opinion
as to whether the shopkeeper's privilege would extend to deten-
tion outside the store but case law has recognized the privilege
grounds to believe that it was committed by the person arrested. He may also arrest
for a misdemeanor committed in his presence. Comment, Shoplifting and the Law of
Arrest: A Problem in Effective Social Legislation, 19 MD. L. Rnv. 28, 31 (1959).
" Note, supra note 25, at 25. There is no liability, however, if one merely gives
the officer the information and leaves it up to him whether to make the arrest. In
addition, probable cause will prevent liability for malicious prosecution. Comment,
supra note 12, at 730.
Comment, supra note 23, at 31.
54 P.2d 20 (Cal. 1936).
See also Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Waller, 189 S.W.2d 361 (Ark. 1945);
Sima v. Skaggs Payless Drug Center, Inc. 353 P.2d 1085 (Idaho 1960); Durand v.
United Dollar Store, Inc., 242 So. 2d 635 (La. App. 1970); Teel v. May Dep't Stores
Co., 155 S.W. 2d 74 (Mo. 1941); Swafford v. Vermillion, 261 P.2d 187 (Okla. 1953);
Cohen v. Lit Bros., 70 A.2d 419 (Pa. Super. 1950).
u RESTATEMENT § 120A.
31 The privilege authorizes detention for investigation only; the law of arrest will
apply if the merchant takes the suspect into custody for the purpose of instituting
criminal proceedings against him. Comment, Survey and Analysis of Criminal and
Tort Aspects of Shoplifting Statutes, 58 MICH. L. REv. 429, 432 (1960).
1976l
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in such circumstances." Other states attempt to resolve the
problem by legislation.' Typically these statutes permit mer-
chants or their employees to detain a suspect upon probable
cause for a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner," al-
though some also allow the merchant to make an arrest if prob-
able cause exists.43
B. Probable Cause
In Malone the Court declared that Kentucky's detention
statute, KRS § 433.236(1) makes probable cause a justification
in the case of suspected shoplifting. This justification is in the
nature of a confession and avoidance defense, which ordinarily
must be pleaded and proved.44 Once the plaintiff shows that
the detention has occurred, the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant who must then prove the existence of probable
cause.4
Probable cause exists when there are circumstances that
would lead a reasonable person to entertain an honest and
strong belief that the person detained is guilty of shoplifting."
10 J.C. Penney Co. v. O'Daniell, 263 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1959); Bonkowski v.
Arlan's Dep't Store, 162 N.W.2d 347 (Mich. App. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 174
N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 1970).
" ALA. CODE, tit. 14 § 334(1) (1959); 11 DEL. C. § 647 (1970); GA. CODE ANN. §
105-1005 (1968); HAWAII REV. LAws § 663-2 (1967); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3044 (1972);
IOWA CODE ANN. 709.24 (1972); Ky. REv. STA. § 433.236 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
KRS]; MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 551A (1971); M.G.L.A. c. 231, § 94B (1971); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 27A.2917 (1962); M.S.A. § 629.366 (1972); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2374-04
(1971); V.A.M.S. § 537.125 (1972); NEv. REv. STAT. § 29-402.01 (1964); N.J.S.A.
2A:170-100 (1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-16-22 (1964); N.Y. GENERAL BUsNEsS LAW
§ 218 (1968); N.C. GEN. STATS. § 14-72.1 (1971); N.D. CEN. CODE § 29-060-27 (1960);
OHIO REv. CODE § 29 35.041 (1971); 22 OKL. ST. ANN. § 1343 (1972); O.R.S. § 164.392
(1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-359.4 (1971); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-824 (1972); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-13-32 (1971); R.C.W.A. 9.01.116 (1972); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3A (1972);
W.S.A. § 943.50 (1971); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-146.3 (1971).
42 See generally Annot., 47 A.L.R.3d 998 (1973).
1 GA. CODE ANN. § 105-1005 (1968); TEx. PEN. CODE, art. 1436e (2) (1972); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 61-3A-4 (1972).
" 32 AM. JUR. 2d False Imprisonment § 99 (1967).
41 J.C. Penney Co. v. Cox, 148 So. 2d 679 (Miss. 1963); Isaiah v. Great Ati. & Pac.
Tea Co., 174 N.E.2d 128 (Ohio App. 1959); Comment, supra note 32, at 197; Comment,
supra note 12, at 737.
46 Gibson v. J.C. Penney Co., 331 P.2d 1057 (Cal. App. 1958); Annot., 47 A.L.R.3D
998, 1006 (1973).
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Mere suspicion is not enough,4" but a series of minor incidents
when taken together may give rise to probable cause, as in the
Malone case.4" In Malone, an employee of the defendant, sta-
tioned in a concealed position above the security office, ob-
served the plaintiff in the baby department apparently carry-
ing some items of baby clothing under her arm. Later, the same
employee saw Mrs. Malone walk over to the shoe department
several times to talk to her mother-in-law. During this period
the baby clothing seen earlier in the plaintiff's possession dis-
appeared. As the plaintiff was heading toward the check-out
counter, the store employee made a quick inspection trip
through the areas where the plaintiff had been seen to deter-
mine if she had left the articles there. Not finding them, the
store employee went to the area near the check-out counter and
accosted the plaintiff, who was waiting by the door while her
companions went through a check-out lane.
Arguably, there was probable cause to believe that the
plaintiff was guilty of shoplifting even though the defendant's
employee did not actually see her conceal the baby clothes. The
plaintiff's frequent trips back and forth from the baby depart-
ment to the shoe department, the gradual disappearance of the
baby clothing during these trips, and the failure to find any of
the missing items where the plaintiff had been, taken together,
provided the defendant's employee with sufficient evidence to
suspect that the plaintiff was a shoplifter. Therefore, the
Court's finding that probable cause might exist seems correct.49
C. Reasonableness of the Detention and Search
A second issue in Malone was the reasonableness of the
detention and the propriety of the search of Mrs. Malone. In
most states a merchant is allowed to detain a suspected shoplif-
ter only for a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner. This
' Butler v. Walker Stores, Inc., 222 So. 2d 128 (Miss. 1969).
Comment, supra note 32, at 197.
" It is important to remember, however, that probable cause is treated as a ques-
tion of law in most states and only if the facts are in dispute should it be left to the
jury. See supra note 18, at 157; Comment, 3 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 269, 270 (1956).
In Malone the testimony of the defendant's employee apparently was not in dis-
pute, so the Court could have held as a matter of law that the probable cause require-
ment was satisfied.
1976]
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is generally a jury question."
A reasonable length of time is usually that required to
conduct an investigation and perhaps to summon a supervisor
with decision-making authority. Some statutes provide explicit
guidelines on the length of time that a suspected shoplifter may
be held." In Kentucky, the merchant may detain a suspect
only long enough to ascertain that his property was in fact
taken and to regain possession of it.52
The detention must also be made in a reasonable man-
ner. 3 Abusive remarks or accusations are not privileged under
most detention statutes.54 According to an opinion 6f the Attor-
ney General, under the Kentucky statute a merchant must
inform the suspect of the reason for the detention and request
the return of the merchandise. 5 If the suspect resists, reasona-
ble force may be used to restrain him,56 but the statutory privi-
lege will be lost if excessive force is used.
Finally, the detention must be made for an authorized
purpose.58 A number of states allow the merchant to detain only
for purposes of investigation, 9 but others, including Kentucky,
permit detention in order to recover stolen goods."0 A few allow
detention only for the purpose of summoning the police,' and
" Delp v. Zapp's Drug & Variety Stores, 395 P.2d 137 (Ore. 1964); Comment,
supra note 12, at 738.
51 HAwAU Rnv. LAws § 663-2 (1967); LA. C. CR. P. art. 215 (1967) (one hour);
S.D.C.L. § 22-37-24 (1967) (time to summon police); WASH. STAT. ANN. § 9.01.116
(1971) (time to examine records); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3A-4; Wis. STAT. ANN. §
943.50 (1971).
52 Ky. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OPINION 69-64 [hereinafter cited as OAG].
u Comment, supra note 39, at 443-44.
" Little Stores v. Isenberg, 172 S.W.2d 13 (Tenn. App. 1943); Annot., 29 A.L.R.3D
961 (1970).
OAG 69-64.
Collyer v. S.H. Kress Co., 54 P.2d 20 (Cal. 1936). The rule is similar to general
tort doctrine regarding the use of force in the recovery of property. Comment, 24 TENN.
L. REv. 1177, 1182-83 (1957).
Jefferson Stores Inc. v. Caudell, 228 So. 2d 99 (Fla. App. 1969); J.C. Penney
Co. v. Cox, 148 So. 2d 679 (Miss. 1963); Peak v. W.T. Grant Co., 386 S.W.2d 685 (Mo.
1964); Lukas v. J.C. Penney Co., 378 P.2d 717 (Ore. 1963).
" Comment, The Protection and Recapture of Merchandise from Shoplifters, 47
Nw. U.L. REv. 82, 85 (1952).
39 Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, New York,
Oregon, South Carolina, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
64 Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Da-
kota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Utah.
" Delaware, Minnesota, South Dakota, Wisconsin.
[Vol. 65
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four states place no limits on the purposes for which a suspect
may be detained. 2
In Malone, the plaintiff was detained for about 15 minutes,
a period which seems reasonable. The defendant's employees
were not rude or abusive, nor did they use excessive force. The
defendant's liability, therefore, must be based on its physical
search of the plaintiff. Accompanied by a uniformed guard, the
plaintiff was escorted to a small closet-like office, where her
handbag was searched by a plainclothes security agent. The
female employee who had observed the plaintiff earlier in the
baby department, was also present. After completing this task,
the man in the plain clothes left the room, and the search was
continued by the female employee. During the course of this
search, the plaintiff was "patted down" and eventually forced
to take off all of her clothes. Since the search failed to uncover
any stolen property, Mrs. Malone was then permitted to leave.
The Kentucky Supreme Court stated that "we see nothing in
this account to support a finding that the manner in which
[the plaintiff] was treated and in which the search was con-
ducted was unreasonable." 3
Malone indicates that KRS § 433.236 authorizes not only
personal searches, but also "strip searches" by store employ-
ees, at least in some cases. The statute says nothing about a
personal search being authorized, but merely states that a mer-
chant may take a suspected shoplifter "into custody and detain
him in a reasonable manner. ... 1 At least one state statute
expressly prohibits personal searches, 5 while a few others seem
to permit them.66 Most statutes, however, are silent on the
subject.
The "plain language" of the Kentucky statute provides no
interpretive guidance. The word "detain" means "to restrain
from proceeding" and does not carry with it the notion of a
search, but the phrase "take into custody" does suggest a
broader privilege than mere detention. 7 Nor does a look at the
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, and North Carolina.
a 530 S.W.2d 680, 683 (Ky. 1975).
KRS § 433.236(1) (1958). '
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.50(3) (1971).
" See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.22-23 (1972).
11 But see OAG 74-94, which states that detention under KRS § 433.236(1) is not
considered an arrest.
1976]
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statutory purpose help very much. The statute authorizes de-
tention for the purpose of recovering stolen merchandise, an
objective that could be accomplished by allowing store person-
nel to detain the suspect long enough to determine whether any
merchandise is missing, to seek an explanation from the cus-
tomer, to demand the return of the property, and perhaps to
summon a police officer. On the other hand, while a personal
search is seldom necessary to accomplish the statutory pur-
pose, it is not inconsistent with this objective either.
Even if KRS § 433.236(1) does sanction a personal search
under some circumstances, the strip search conducted in the
Malone case was unreasonable and therefore exceeded the sta-
tutory privilege. The search, made under an implied threat of
force and against the plaintiff's will, was a substantial and
intentional invasion of her person. While the defendant is enti-
tled to take reasonable measures to protect its property, the
value of the goods involved here was not sufficient to justify so
serious an invasion of the plaintiff's dignitary interests. At the
very least the issue of reasonableness in this case should have
been regarded as a jury question."
D. Conclusion
Shoplifting is unquestionably a serious social and eco-
nomic problem." Although shoplifting is a crime,7" the criminal
process alone cannot deal with it,71 and merchants must rely on
a variety of measures to deter thefts and recover their prop-
erty.72 Clearly a return to the common-law rules discussed ear-
lier would substantially impair the effectiveness of these ef-
forts. On the other hand, the economic interests of the retail
sales industry must be balanced against the rights of individu-
6 The Kentucky Court also overturned the jury's verdict of $2,500 in punitive
damages against the defendant.
11 Losses from shoplifting amount to about'$5 billion annually in the United
States. Shoplifting losses are equal to about 2 percent of overall sales volume for the
average store, and the average value of a stolen article is about $28. 57 STORES, Oct.
11, 1975, at 25.
10 See KRS § 433.234(1) (1958).
1 The crime of shoplifting is often difficult to prove, and sometimes merchants
are reluctant to prosecute because it results in poor public relations for the store.
Comment, supra note 18, at 142.
72 Comment, supra note 39, at 429-30.
[Vol. 65
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als mistakenly accused of shoplifting. The detention of sus-
pected shoplifters represents a substantial, though acceptable,
invasion of this right, but the authorization of personal
searches under a detention statute goes too far. If individuals
must be searched without their consent, it should be done by
police officers under conditions where the suspect is protected
by the criminal process.
We suggest, therefore, that KRS § 433.236(1) should be
amended to provide that a merchant or his employee may de-
tain a suspected shoplifter only to determine whether property
has been taken by the suspect, to recover the property, or to
summon the police for investigation or arrest. The legislature
should limit the detention period to a maximum of 1 hour. The
probable cause requirement should be retained, but the mer-
chant's right to search should be restricted to handbags and
outer garments such as overcoats. Personal searches beyond
this, by private individuals without the consent of the suspect,
should be specifically prohibited.
Although some increased losses from shoplifting might
occur, it is doubtful, that the statutory revision suggested
above would seriously harm retail merchants. Merchants
might simply absorb these additional costs, but hopefully they
will hire additional sales personnel, display their merchandise
in a different manner, or take other measures to reduce the
incidence of shoplifting. Whichever alternative is chosen, its
economic costs will be spread among the consuming public.
The strip search of a suspected shoplifter by store personnel is
an intolerable affront to human dignity. The approach sug-
gested above provides an acceptable level of protection for the
retail merchant without imposing an unfair burden on innocent
customers who are wrongfully suspected of shoplifting.
II. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
In Eigelbach v. Watts 3 the Kentucky Supreme Court re-
fused to permit the plaintiff to recover for intentional infliction
of emotional distress. The defendant, Watts, engaged in a
heated argument with Mrs. Eigelbach in the early part of the
afternoon and threatened to return that night and kill the
' No. 74-336 (Ky., Feb. 20, 1976) (per curiam).
1976]
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plaintiff and her son. Mrs. Eigelbach was apprehensive during
the remainder of the day and died that night after she had gone
to bed, about 10 hours after the argument. Although Watts did
not touch her, it was claimed that his threats and language
severely disturbed her and contributed to her death. In a brief
memorandum opinion affirming the judgment below, the Court
declared that, "[tihere is no showing of any physical contact
between Watts and Ada Eigelbach. In the absence of such con-
tact, no recovery may be had for language used at any time
which may have produced fright or shock or injuries resulting
from such fright or shock unaccompanied by such physical
contact."74
A. Development of an Independent Action for Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress
In most states, intentional infliction of emotional distress
is an independent cause of action to recover damages not only
for intentionally-caused mental or psychic injuries but also for
any physical harm produced as a direct consequence of such
emotional disturbance. Both English and American courts gen-
erally refused to entertain such actions until the present cen-
tury. 5 In the words of one 19th century English jurist,
"[m]ental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not
pretend to redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes
74 Id.
11 Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic
Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REv. 193, 193-212 (1944). Roman law, however, under the concept
of injuria gave relief against insults and abusive language. DIGEST 47.10.1, 47.10.15;
INswrrTEs 4.4.1. This action was based on outrage to feelings as well as loss to reputa-
tion. De Villiers, The Roman Law of Defamation, 34 L.Q. REv. 412, 417 (1918). Influ-
enced by Roman civil law, the English eccelesiastical courts during the middle ages
punished insults as contumelia. T. PLucKNmrT, CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw
484 n.2 (5th ed. 1956). In addition, the local courts of medieval England often allowed
civil as well as criminal actions for insults. Wade, Tort Liability for Abusive and
Insulting Language, 4 VAND. L. REv. 63, 64-65 (1950). Later, the action of libel as it
developed in the Court of Star Chamber provided relief against insults, while the
action of slander as it developed in the Court of King's Bench concerned itself with
damage to reputation. Holdsworth, Defamation in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth
Century, 40 L.Q. Rxv. 302, 304 (1924); Ausness, Libel Per Quod in Florida, 23 U. FLA.
L. REV. 51, 53 (1970). The availability both of criminal penalties and civil damages
for insult in Star Chamber proceedings was intended to discourage duels. Modern
statutes in some American jurisdictions were originally designed to serve the same
purpose. Miss. CODE ANN. § 95-1-1 (1972); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-2 (1966).
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that alone.""6 However, the courts often mitigated the harsh-
ness of this rule by allowing recovery for emotional distress
under the guises of assault,77 battery,78 false imprisonment,7"
invasion of privacy," and even trespass to land.8 ' Damages for
emotional distress were characterized as "parasitic" in such
cases because they were supported by the underlying
"technical" tort.82
In addition, the courts recognized a number of exceptions
to the general rule against recovery. For example, a long line
of cases held that a common carrier must provide its passengers
with courteous treatment.1 This duty originally rested on a
contractual basis,84 but later cases also allowed nonpassengers
, Lynch v. Knight, 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (H.L. 1861)(Lord Wensleydale).
'7 Erwin v. Milligan, 67 S.W.2d 592, 593 (Ark. 1934); Atlanta Hub Co. v. Jones,
171 S.E. 470, 472 (Ga. 1933); Johnson v. Hahn, 150 N.W. 6 (Iowa 1914); Kurpgeweit
v. Kirby, 129 N.W. 177 (Neb. 1910).
Is Interstate Life & Accident Co. v. Brewer, 193 S.E. 458, 462 (Ga. 1937); Draper
v. Baker, 21 N.W. 527, 528 (Wis. 1884).
1, Godsden Gen. Hosp. v. Hamilton, 103 So. 553, 554 (Ala. 1925); Fisher v. Rum-
ler, 214 N.W. 310, 311 (Mich. 1927); Salisbury v. Poulson, 172 P. 315, 316 (Utah 1918).
,0 Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967, 971 (Ky. 1927); Barber v. Time, Inc., 159
S.W.2d 291, 293-94 (Mo. 1942).
" Am. Security Co. v. Cook, 176 S.E. 798, 800 (Ga. App. 1934); Continental Cas.
Co. v. Garrett, 161 So. 753, 755 (Miss. 1935).
a' RESTATEMENT § 47, comment b at 80-81; Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAUF.
L. REv. 40, 42-43 (1956); Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New
Tort, 37 MICH. L. REv. 874, 880-81 (1939). The case of Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel,
Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967), provides a good illustration of this principle. The
plaintiff in Fisher, a black scientist employed by NASA, was attending a conference
at the defendant's hotel with a group of about 25 or 30 colleagues. As the plaintiff stood
in line at a buffet style luncheon, one of the defendant's employees snatched the plate
from his hand and shouted that he, a Negro, could not be served. The plaintiff was
consequently embarrassed and humiliated. On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court held
that the defendant's employee had committed a battery by snatching the plate from
the man's hand, although the refusal to serve, not the snatching of the plate, was the
real cause of the injury. The damages for emotional distress were thus "parasitic" to
the technical battery committed against the plaintiff.
1 Berger v. Southern Pac. Co., 300 P.2d 170, 173 (Cal. App. 1956); Gebhardt v.
Public Serv. Coordinated Transp., 137 A.2d 48 (N.J. Super. 1957); Brown v. Fifth Ave.
Coach Lines, 185 N.Y.S.2d 923 (N.Y. App. 1959). RESTATEMENT OF ToRT § 48 (1934);
Annot., 60 A.L.R.2D 1104 (1958); Wade, Tort Liability for Abusive and Insulting
Language, 4 VAND. L. REv. 63, 66-71 (1950). There is no liability, however, for mere
discourtesy; the defendant's words or actions must actually be insulting or abusive.
New York, L.E. & W.R. Co. v. Bennett, 50 F. 496, 501 (6th Cir. 1892); Crutcher v.
Cleveland, C.C. & St. L.R.R., 111 S.W. 891, 893 (Mo. App. 1908).
I" Bleecker v. Colorado & S. Ry., 114 P. 481 (Colo. 1911); Frewen v. Page, 131 N.E.
475 (Mass. 1921).
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to recover for offensive behavior by employees of a common
carrier." Similar liability was imposed upon innkeepers in a
number of jurisdictions," although recovery was usually lim-
ited to hotel guests." On occasion, liability for gross insult was
extended to telegraph companies, 8 although not to retail mer-
chants generally.89
Some courts also awarded damages for mental distress ar-
ising from the mishandling of a dead body,9" and wrongful with-
holding of the body. 4 Although recovery was usually predi-
cated upon wrongful interference with a property interest in the
corpse,95 the concern for the emotional well-being of the survi-
vors seems to have been the actual basis for the tort. 8
Eventually, the exceptions swallowed up the rule as the
American courts began to recognize a separate and indepen-
dent cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress. The new tort was approved by the American Law Insti-
tute in 1947 and duly incorporated into the Restatement of
Torts. The great majority of jurisdictions now allow the plain-
tiff to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress
and most follow the Restatement's formulation.97 According to
the Restatement, "[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous con-
"5 St. Louis-San Francisco R.R. v. Clark, 229 P. 779 (Okla. 1924); Jones v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 94 S.E. 490 (S.C. 1917).
" Wiggs v. Courshon, 355 F. Supp. 206 (S.D. Fla.), appeal dismissed, 485 F.2d
1281 (5th Cir. 1973); Milner Hotels v. Dougherty, 15 So. 2d 358 (Miss. 1943).
"7 Wallace v. Shoreham Hotel Corp., 49 A.2d 81 (Mun. App. D.C. 1946); Jenkins
v. Kentucky Hotel, Inc., 87 S.W.2d 951 (Ky. 1935).
" Dunn v. Western Union Tel. Co., 59 S.E.2d 189 (Ga. App. 1970); Buchannan
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 106 S.E. 159 (S.C. 1920).
9 Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Fla., 100 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1958); Miller v. Fried-
man's Jewelers, Inc., 131 S.E.2d 663 (Ga. App. 1963).
,0 Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV.
L. REv. 1033, 1064-67 (1936).
" Kirsey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1950).
, Papieves v. Kelley, 263 A.2d 118 (Pa. 1970); Comment, 10 DUQUESNE L. REv.
296 (1971).
,1 Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic Church of the Sacred Hearts of Jesus and Mary,
186 N.E. 798 (N.Y. 1933).
'" Alcorn v. Adams Express Co., 146 S.W. 747 (Ky. 1912); Gadbury v. Bleitz, 233
P. 299 (Wash. 1925).
,1 22 AM. JuR. 2d Dead Bodies § 4 (1965); Note, Nature of the Rights in a Dead
Body, 18 MINN. L. Rav. 204 (1934).
Badbury v. Bleitz, 233 P. 299 (Wash. 1925); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 868 (1939).
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12 (4th ed. 1971).
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duct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional dis-
tress to another is subject to liability for such emotional dis-
tress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such
bodily harm.""8 Thus, two elements are necessary in an action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress: the defendant
must be guilty of extreme and outrageous conduct; and his
actions must cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress.
These requirements restrict the scope of the tort considerably.
Outrageous conduct involves more than a mere intent to
cause emotional distress. In the words of one commentator,
"[1]iability has been imposed only in cases where the conduct
has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree,
as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be re-
garded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized com-
munity."9 Conduct of this sort is genuinely uncommon al-
though some of the more outrageous tactics of bill collectors, ®
insurance claims adjusters,10' and landlords' 2 have met the
test. Abuse of authority has also given rise to liability in this
area.0 3 Normally, the standard is an objective one and the
conduct must be such that it would cause severe emotional
distress in a person of ordinary sensibilities,"4 but recovery has
been allowed for less offensive conduct in the case of small
children"5 and weak or unusually susceptible persons where the
defendant had knowledge of their condition.' 9
Not only must the defendant's conduct be outrageous, but
" RESTATEMENT § 46(1).
" Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAL. L. REv. 40, 44 (1956).
o Annot., 46 A.L.R.3D 773 (1972); Berger, The Bill Collector and the Law, 17 DE
PAUL L. REv. 327 (1968); Note, Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress in the Debtor-
Creditor Relationship, 37 ALB. L. REV. 797 (1973); Note, Mental Distress from
Collection Activities, 17 HAST. L.J. 369 (1965).
"' Frishett v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Insur. Co., 143 N.W.2d 612 (Mich. App.
1966); Fletcher v. Western Nat. Life Insur. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970); Annot. 39
A.L.R.3D 739 (1971).
I" Kaufman v. Abramson, 363 F.2d 865 (4th Cir. 1966).
" Johnson v. Sampson, 208 N.W. 814 (Minn. 1926).
104 Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALF. L. REv. 40, 53 (1956).
Korbin v. Berlin, 177 So. 2d 551 (Fla. App. 1965); Delta Fin. Co. v. Ganakas,
91 S.E.2d 383 (Ga. 1956).
I0 Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men of Washington D.C., 105 F.2d 62 (D.C.
Cir. 1932); Nickerson v. Hodges, 84 So. 37 (La. 1920); Continental Cas. Co. v. Garrett,
161 So. 753 (Miss. 1935).
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it must also cause severe emotional distress. 07 Normally, it is
up to the jury to determine whether there has been the requi-
site degree of emotional disturbance. 10 Although most states do
not require that the plaintiff's emotional distress manifest it-
self by physical symptoms,0 9 in the great majority of cases the
plaintiff has suffered a physical illness of a serious character.
Applying these criteria to the Eigelbach case, it is by no
means certain that the plaintiff would have been able to re-
cover. Looking first at the defendant's conduct, it is debatable
whether the defendant's action met the "outrageous conduct"
standard. Mere threats alone would probably not be enough,
although an explicit threat to kill the plaintiff and her child at
a particular time and place, if part of a pattern of harassment,
might be sufficient."10
In order to determine whether the defendant's threat could
be expected to cause severe emotional distress, it must be as-
certained whether the plaintiff was likely to take the threat
seriously. Apparently, she and her child were living alone and
were therefore vulnerable to a physical attack. If the defendant
had a history of violence, his threat to kill might have been
sufficient to cause severe emotional distress. Since the plaintiff
died of a heart attack, it is possible that she was weak and
unusually susceptible to emotional trauma; if the defendant
knew of her susceptibility, he might be held liable even though
his actions would not be expected to cause serious harm if
directed at an ordinary person.
Finally, there is no direct proof that the defendant's con-
duct caused or contributed to the plaintiff's heart attack, al-
though the temporal proximity of the two events suggests a
causal relationship. No doubt the cause-in-fact issue would
have posed a serious problem for the plaintiff and the causal
connection could only have been established by expert medical
testimony.
"I Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Fla., 100 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1958).
' Savage v. Boies, 272 P.2d 349 (Ariz. 1954); 38 AM. JuR. 2d Fright, Shock &
Mental Disturbance § 7 (1968).
," E.g., Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344 (Utah 1961).
, State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282 (Cal. 1952).
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B. Recovery for Emotional Distress in Kentucky
Eigelbach is consistent with prior Kentucky decisions on
this issue. Except in cases of gross insult by employees of a
common carrier,"' mishandling of dead bodies,"' and negligent
transmission or misdelivery of death messages," the Kentucky
courts have refused to allow recovery for emotional distress
unless accompanied by a direct, contemporaneous physical
contact or injury.1 This requirement, known as the "impact
rule," is almost universally rejected in America where the de-
fendant's conduct is intentional,115 and survives in only a few
states in cases of negligently caused emotional distress."6 The
rule as it is employed in Kentucky is smiliar to the "parasitic
damages" approach discussed earlier, and over the years has
produced some absurd results. For example, damages for emo-
tional distress were allowed in Ragsdale v. Ezell,"7 where the
defendant kissed the plaintiff, but denied in Morgan v. High-
"' Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Francisco, 148 S.W. 46 (Ky. 1912); Quinn v. Louisville
& N. Ry., 32 S.W. 742 (Ky. 1895). A common carrier may also be held liable for failure
to prevent abuse of a customer by another passenger. Louisville & N. Ry. v. Bell, 179
S.W. 400 (Ky. 1915).
IZ North East Coal Co. v. Pickelsimer, 68 S.W.2d 760 (Ky. 1934); Streipe v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 47 S.W.2d 1004 (Ky. 1932); Douglas v. Stokes, 149 S.W. 849
(Ky. 1912); Alcom v. Adams Express Co., 146 S.W. 747 (Ky. 1912).
"I Smith v. Cowdy, 244 S.W. 678 (Ky. 1922); Hockenhammer v. Lexington &
E.R.R., 74 S.W. 222 (Ky. 1903); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Van Cleave, 54 S.W. 827
(Ky. 1900); Chapman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 13 S.W. 880 (Ky. 1890); Comment,
19 Ky. L.J. 259, 260 (1931).
"' Weber-Stair Co. v. Fisher, 119 S.W. 195 (Ky. 1909), seems to be the only
departure from this pattern. The plaintiff in that case recovered for emotional distress
caused by the defendant's employees who wrongfully ejected him from a theater and
threatened to have him arrested. But see Capital Theatre Co. v. Compton, 54 S.W.2d
620 (Ky. 1932).
M' George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 268 N.E.2d 915 (Mass. 1971); Monteleone v. Co-
Operative Transit Co., 36 S.E.2d 475 (W. Va. 1945); 38 AM. JuR.2d Fright, Shock &
Mental Disturbance § 14 (1968); Comment, 6 SuFFoLK L. Rav. 140 (1971). But see
Bartow v. Smith, 78 N.E.2d 735 (Ohio 1948).
"I St. Louis, I.M. & S.R.R. v. Bragg, 64 S.W. 226 (Ark. 1901); Gilliam v. Stewart,
291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974); Braun v. Craven, 51 N.E. 657 (Ill. 1898); Boston v.
Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 61 N.E.2d 326 (Ind. 1945); Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co.
v. Roman's Guardian, 23 S.W.2d 272 (Ky. 1929); Sullivan v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc.,
168 N.E.2d 80 (Mass. 1960); Gambill v. White, 303 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1957); Miller v.
Baltimore & S.W.R.R., 85 N.E. 499 (Ohio 1908); Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100 (1959).
'I 49 S.W. 775 (Ky. 1899). On the other hand, recovery was denied in Reed v.
Maley, 74 S.W. 1079 (Ky. 1903), where the amorous defendant made an indecent
proposal to an unresponsive plaintiff.
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tower's Administrator,'18 where the defendant shot and killed
himself in the plaintiff's presence, even though the plaintiff
was shocked by this bloody and wholly unexpected suicide and
required medical attention.
Often very slight and unrelated physical conduct has been
sufficient to satisfy the impact requirement. In Chesapeake &
Ohio Ry. v. Robinett, 119 a train conductor committed a battery
upon the plaintiff's father in her presence and the plaintiff, a
young girl, was upset by the incident. Ordinarily, no recovery
would be allowed in these circumstances,' but during the
course of the fight the defendant shoved the plaintiff's father
against her. The court held that this contact, though incidental
and slight, was enough to satisfy the impact requirement, and
permitted the young girl to recover for the emotional distress
she suffered as a result of seeing her father struck by the train
conductor.
McGee v. Vanover I provides another illustration of the
capriciousness of the impact rule. In that case the two defen-
dants beat up the plaintiff's husband while she was present.
She became frightened and consequently suffered a miscar-
riage. During the altercation, one of the defendants, Evans,
pushed the plaintiff aside in order to reach her husband, but
McGee, the other defendant, did not touch her. As a result, the
plaintiff was permitted to recover against Evans, but not
against McGee.
C. Conclusion
In the past the courts have given a variety of reasons for
refusing to allow an independent action for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. Recovery has been denied because
damages for psychic injury were deemed insubstantial and
impossible to measure. The courts also complained that such
damages were difficult to prove and expressed fears of being
inundated by a flood of trivial or fraudulant claims.112 However,
uS 163 S.W.2d 21 (Ky. 1942).
152 S.W. 976 (Ky. 1913).
' Reed v. Ford, 112 S.W. 600 (Ky. 1908).
121 147 S.W. 742 (Ky. 1912).
"' Reed v. Maley, 74 S.W. 1079, 1080 (Ky. 1903). This language is taken almost
verbatim from Wadsworth v. Western Union Tel. Co., 8 S.W. 574, 582-83 (Tenn. 1888).
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in our opinion none of these contentions is serious enough to
justify Kentucky's continuing refusal to provide a remedy for
the victims of intentionally-caused mental distress.
There is no longer any doubt that damages from severe
emotional disturbances are real and not merely
"metaphysical" and insubstantial. The science of psychiatry
recognizes that such emotional or mental conditions as anxiety
and depresion have objective characteristics and can be treated
by means of psychotherapeutic methods. ' In addition, emo-
tional trauma may also produce physical consequences such as
gastrointestinal and cardiovascular symptoms, genitourinary
problems, along with headaches, backaches, and a variety of
other lesser ailments.' These injuries are clearly no less sub-
stantial when induced by psychic stimuli than when they are
caused by physical contact.
"Nonphysical" damages caused by emotional distress are
admittedly difficult to measure;2 5 however, problems of this
sort have not deterred Kentucky courts from allowing plaintiffs
to recover for such damages in cases involving common car-
riers, telegraph companies, or the mishandling of dead bodies.
Courts have also overcome such difficulties in numerous as-
sault and battery and false imprisonment cases where psychic
harm was the primary element of damage. In addition, as men-
tioned earlier, mental distress cases often involve physical as
well as emotional injuries. It is hard to see that the difficulty
of measurement rationale has any validity at all when the in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress causes physical harm.
In Eigelbach, for example, the jury would not have been re-
quired to measure a purely psychic injury. Since the plaintiff
allegedly died as the result of defendant's tortious conduct,
damages would be measured according to the provisions of the
state wrongful death statute.
Emotional distress cases unquestionably present more dif-
ficult causation problems than other types of personal injury
I" See generally AYD, RECOGNIZING THE DEPRESSED PATIENT (1961); Goodrich,
Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. Rsv. 497 (1922).
M22 Note, Expanding the Concept of Recovery for Mental and Emotional Injury,
76 W. VA. L. REv. 176, 192 (1974).
I" Dearman, The Psychiatric Examination of the Client, 32 'tNN. L. REv. 592
(1965).
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litigation, but these difficulties should not induce the courts to
deny recovery across the board. After all, the burden of proof
is on the plaintiff, and in most instances he will be required to
establish causation by means of expert medical testimony.'26
Perhaps this is why no proliferation of fraudulent claims has
materialized in those states which have permitted actions for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 121
Furthermore, even if a case could be made for limiting
recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the
impact requirement in Kentucky can no longer be justified. At
one time medical scholars apparently believed that all mental
and emotional ills were traceable to physical problems, and the
impact rule was a reflection of this thinking.' 28 With the advent
of Freudian psychology the older theory was abandoned and
consequently there is no longer any scientific justification for
the impact requirement. 129
The impact requirement is also unsound from a policy
perspective. It is a mechanical approach to the liability issue,
which concentrates on the presence or absence of physical con-
tact and for the most part ignores both the character of the
defendant's conduct and the nature of the plaintiff's injuries.
This approach often leads to absurd and unjust results. The
time has come for Kentucky to reject the impact test. As one
commentator remarked, "If 'impact' is no criterion for distin-
guishing good from bad claims it requires but little courage to
renounce it as a fit test of liability."'3
The Kentucky Supreme Court should have adopted the
language of the Restatement of Torts and recognized an inde-
penden" action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The Restatement's requirement of "outrageous conduct" and
"severe emotional distress," along with its use of a "person of
' Smith, Problems of Proof in Psychic Injury Cases, 14 SYRAcusE L. Rxv. 586
(1963).
Note, Torts-Damages for Fright, 24 Ky. L.J. 69 (1935).
'N' TRAUMATIC MEDICINE & SURGERY FOR THE ATTORNEY 87 (P. Cantor ed. 1962);
Note, Expanding the Concept of Recovery for Mental and Emotional Injury, 76 NV. VA.
L. REv. 176, 191 (1974).
12' Robitscher, Mental Suffering and Traumatic Neurosis, in CoMPENsATON IN
PSYCHIATRIC DIsABILrr AND REHABnTATION 218, 220-223 (J. Leedy, ed. 1971).
"' Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic
Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REv. 193, 301 (1944).
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ordinary sensibilities" standard, insures that plaintiffs will not
be allowed to recover for minor insults, rudeness, or other
breaches of social decorum, and that defendants will not be
held liable for bizarre and wholly unforeseeable consequences
when their conduct is only mildly culpable. In short, the Re-
statement represents a more intelligent approach to the issue
of liability for intentionally caused emotional distress than
Kentucky's impact rule.
Therefore, despite the lack of impact, the Eigelbach case
should not have been dismissed. Since the plaintiff died, it can
be assumed that her injury was not fraudulent or trivial, nor
were her damages "speculative," "metaphysical," or impossi-
ble to determine. Based on the available facts, it cannot be said
whether the defendant's conduct was outrageous or likely to
have caused severe emotional distress. Accordingly, these is-
sues should have been left for the jury to determine, along with
the question of whether there was any causal connection be-
tween the defendant's arguably tortious conduct and the plain-
tiff's undeniably substantial injury.
III. PRODUCTS LL~mrrY
The plaintiff in McMichael v. American Red Cross '31 con-
tracted serum hepatitis from transfusions of whole blood and
plasma supplied by the American Red Cross and brought suit
under alternative thoeries of breach of implied warranty and
strict liability in tort. Holding that a sale was essential to a
cause of action under either theory, the lower court character-
ized the transaction as a service and directed a verdict for the
defendant. On appeal, the Kentucky Supreihe Court did not
reach this issue, but instead determined that the product was
unavoidable unsafe, not unmerchantable or unreasonably dan-
gerous, and affirmed the lower court's decision. Kentucky thus
joins most other jurisdictions in refusing to impose strict liabil-
ity upon hospitals or blood banks who transmit hepatitis
through the transfusion of contaminated blood.132
t31 532 S.W.2d 7 (Ky. 1975).
' See generally Butterich & Wilson, Serum Hepatitis-A Historical Perspective
and Current Progress, 36 U. MICH. MED. CENTER J. 67 (1970). Hepatitis is an inflamma-
tion of the liver and can be caused by viruses, bacteria, drugs, toxic chemicals and
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A. Medical Aspects
Serum hepatitis13  is a disease of the liver which can cause
illness, permanent disability, 34  or even death.3 5 Approxi-
mately 30,000 Americans a year, 131 or 1 percent of those who
receive blood transfusions, become infected with serum hepati-
tis.' 3 Although 2 to 3 percent of the adult American population
are carriers of serum hepatitis, 38 a carrier may never show
symptoms of the disease, and may pass it on to many others if
he donates blood. 9 A number of tests have been developed to
detect serum hepatitis virus in the blood, including simple liver
function tests,4 0 the serum immunoglobin test,' and the Aus-
other noxious agents. Infectious hepatitis and serum hepatitis are the major types of
viral hepatitis. Infectious hepatitis virus, or virus A, enters the body either through
the gastrointestinal tract or through parenteral introduction. (Parenteral means that
the virus in introduced directly into the tissues.) Van Wormer, Transfusion Associated
Hepatitis, 12 CALF. W.L. REv. 389 (1976). Serum hepatitis virus, or virus B, enters the
body only through the parenteral route. Dunn, Blood Transfusions and Serum
Hepatitis, 15 CLEv.-MAI. L. REv. 497, 498 (1966).
13 See generally Annot., 45 A.L.R.3D 1364 (1972).
'1 Symptoms include tiredness, depression, severe headaches, loss of appetite,
weight loss, chills, fever, acute nausea, enlarged and tender liver or spleen, as well as
jaundice. Severe cases may also involve insomnia, excessive irritability, confusion,
asterexis, drowsiness, convulsions, and coma. 2 R. GRAY, ATToRNEY's TEXTBOOK OF
MEDICINE 38.30-38.37 (3d ed. 1970). Treatment consists primarily of adequate rest
and good diet. There is no drug which can speed the healing process, although cortisone
and similar drugs sometimes give beneficial results. Holder, Serum Hepatitis, 6
LAwYERs MED. J. 79, 83 (1970).
"I' Note, Hospital's Liability for Transfusing Serum Hepatitis, Contaminated
Blood, 44 TEMP. L.Q. 575, 575 (1971). It is believed that approximately 3,000 persons
annually die of the disease as a result of blood transfusions. Comment, 16 VmL. L. REv.
983, 986 (1971). Estimates of the death rate vary from 3.5 to 12 percent. Chalmers, Koff
& Grady, A Note on Fatality in Serum Hepatitis, 49 GASTROENTEROLOGY 23 (1965);
Weiner, Medicolegal Aspects of Blood Transfusions, 151 J.A.M.A. 1435, 1437 (1953).
However, the risk associated with hepatitis rises monotonically with age, and about
20 percent of those over age of 40 who contract the disease die as a result. Kessel,
Transfused Blood, Serum Hepatitis and the Coase Theorem, 17 J. LAw & EcoN. 265,
268 (1974).
"38 Ward, Detecting Viral Hepatitis in Blood Transfusions: Recent Developments,
12 CAuLF. W.L. REv. 380, 381 (1976).
' Trout, Blood Transfusions, 73 DICK. L. Rv. 201, 212 (1969). Estimates of the
infection rate, however, vary from .2 percent to 3 percent for whole blood. Comment,
69 MICH. L. REv. 1172, 1174 n.12 (1971).
'U Comment, Liability for Transfusions of Hepatitis Infected Blood, 5 U. RICH. L.
REv. 364, at 364 (1971).
'39 Mosley & Galambos, Viral Hepatitis, in DIsEAsEs OF THE LIvER 410, 420 (L.
Schiff ed. 1969).
"I These include thymol turbidity tests, urine bilirubin tests and tests of elevated
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tralian antigen test.4 2 Unfortunately, none of these tests is en-
tirely satisfactory, nor can the virus be destroyed or removed
from whole blood once it is drawn.' Consequently, until better
tests are developed, careful screening of donors is perhaps the
most effective way to reduce the risk of infection.'
B. Implied Warranty
The plaintiff in McMichael alleged a breach of implied
warranty,' arguing that the blood in question was neither mer-
chantable,' nor fit for its intended purpose.'47 Although some
of the Uniform Commercial Code's provisions apply only to
merchants, the expansive definition of "merchant" found in §
serum glutamic oxalactic transaminase activity. Garibaldi, A New Look at Hospitals'
Liability for Hepatitis Contaminated Blood on Principles of Strict Tort Liability, 48
CHI. BAR REc. 204, 206 (1967). While these tests would not eliminate all carriers of
serum hepatitis as blood donors, they would result in the rejection of about 40 percent
of all potential donors, though only a small number of these rejects would be carriers
of the serum hepatitis virus. Note, Medical Judgment v. Legal Doctrine in the Matter
of Hepatitis Contaminated Blood, 49 CHI. BAR. REc. 22, 23 (1967).
"I Testing the level of serum immunoglobulin in the donor's blood, sometimes
known as the "HIM" test, does not also eliminate large number of noncarriers as do
liver function tests. Bevan, Taswell & Gleich, Serum Immunoglobulin Levels in Blood
Donors Implicated in the Transmission of Hepatitis, 203 J.A.M.A. 38 (1968). However,
this test apparently can only detect 50 to 60 percent of the hepatitis carriers. Trout,
Blood Transfusions, 73 DICK. L. REv. 201, 219 (1969). See also Weaver, King & Brown,
A Clinical Evaluation of the "HIM" Test, 49 AM. J. CUN. PATH. 647 (1968).
"I It is believed that Australian antigen and serum hepatitis virus are closely
related. A test for the presence of "Australian antigen" has been developed. Prince,
Relation of Australian and SH Antigens, 2 THE LANCET 462 (1965). This test, known
as the hepatitis-associated antigen or HAA test, when put into general use, will iden-
tify about 25 percent of the hepatitis carriers. Blumberg, Sutnich, London & Millman,
Australian Antigen and Hepatitis, 283 NEw ENG. J. MED. 349 (1970).
3 The only blood products which can be prepared completely free of serum hepa-
titis virus are albumin and gamma globulin since these substances can be heated
during manufacture without destroying their biologic properties. Holder, Serum
Hepatitis, 6 LAwYERs MED. J. 79, 80 (1970). There are also methods available to treat
plasma in order to destroy any virus present. Allen, Enerson, Barron & Skyes, Pooled
Plasma with Little or No Risk of Homologous Serum Jaundice, 154 J.A.M.A. 103
(1954). Note, Liability for Serum Hepatitis in Blood Transfusions, 32 OHIO ST. L.J.
585, 585 (1971).
"I Note, Strict Liability-The Medical Service Immunity and Blood Transfusions
in California, 7 U.C.D.L. REv. 196, 196 n.1 (1974).
"I Breach of express warranty is rare in this area. Note, Blood Transfusions and
Human Transplants: A Problem of Proof and Causation, 4 IND. LEGAL F. 518, 528
(1971); but see Napoli v. St. Peter's Hosp. of Brooklyn, 213 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1961).
24 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314.
47 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315.
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2-104(1) could probably include hospitals and blood banks. '48
However, according to § 2-102, the Code's warranty provisions
apply only to sales involving "transactions in goods," and do
not cover service transactions."9 Section 2-106(1) of the UCC
declares that "[a] sale [of goods] consists in the passing of
title from a seller to the buyer for a price. . . ." The sale of
blood from a commercial blood bank to a hospital would clearly
fit this definition and thus fall within the scope of the Code's
mechantability and fitness warranties. The case of the non-
commercial blood bank is more difficult, although the Red
Cross and other community blood banks usually charge hospi-
tals a fee for processing the blood, 5 ' a practice that would
seemingly meet the literal requirements of § 2-106(1). In addi-
tion, a sale would perhaps occur when the hospital charges a
patient for each unit of blood transfused, even though the
transaction is billed as a service. 5'
Nevertheless, the trial court in McMichael determined
that the transaction between the blood bank and the patient
was a service rather than a sale, basing its conclusion on KRS
§ 139.125, which states that "the procurement, processing, dis-
tribution or use of whole blood, plasma, blood products, blood
derivatives and other human tissue . . . is declared not to be
a sale. . . ." On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the statute
dealt with the applicability of the state sales tax and had no
bearing on the defendant's liability under tort or implied war-
ranty principles. Although the Kentucky Supreme Court
avoided the sale-versus-service problem by reaching its deci-
sion on other grounds, the issue nevertheless deserves some
discussion here.
Until recently, most courts, relying on Perlmutter v. Beth
David Hospital,5 2 denied relief by characterizing the supplying
of blood to a patient as a service rather than a sale. The court
Note, Hospital's Liability, supra note 135, at 581.
" Note, Blood Transfusions and Human Transplants, supra note 145, at 530.
'" Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis: An Analysis and a Proposal, 24 STAN.
L. REv. 439, 441 (1972). A fee of $9.95 per unit was charged in McMichael. 533 S.W.2d
at 8.
131 Uniform Commercial Code Commentary, Blood Transfusions and Warranty
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 9 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 943, 946-47
(1968).
152 123 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1954).
[Vol. 65
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in Perlmutter found that the predominant aspect of the parties'
relationship was the rendering of medical care and that the
furnishing of blood was only an "incidental and very secondary
adjunct"'153 to the performance of that service and thus outside
the scope of the implied warranty provisions of the state sales
act. In the words of the Perlmutter court, "it was not for
blood-or iodine or bandages-for which plaintiff bargained,
but the wherewithal of the hospital facilities to provide what-
ever medical treatment was considered admissible."' 154 The
court in Perlmutter relied on a long line of cases holding that
the transfer of property was not a sale when it was merely
"accessory" to a service contract.'55 This reasoning is still fol-
lowed in many states, 5' and has been extended to blood banks
in some cases. 157 In addition, many states have enacted statutes
like KRS § 139.125, which declare that the supplying of blood
for purposes of a transfusion is a service rather than a sale. 5"
Nevertheless Perlmutter has been criticized because the court
used a technical aspect of contract law to avoid a discussion of
the underlying policy considerations. 5 '
"" Id. at 795.
154 Id.
Ms' Comment, 71 COLUM. L. Rav. 487, 488 (1971). Thus, a contract to paint a
picture would not be regarded as a sale of the canvas. The New York court applied
the so-called "essence" test of Clay v. Yates, 156 Eng. Rep. 1125 (Ex. 1856). Comment,
2 Loy. CHI. L.J. 217, 218 (1971). For a discussion of the various tests employed to
distinguish sales from service contracts see Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality
in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L. Pav. 653, 663 (1957); Note, Products and the Profes-
sional: Strict Liability in the Sale-Service Hybrid Transaction, 24 HAST. L.J. 111, 113-
15 (1972).
M Sloneker v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 105 (D. Colo. 1964); Epstein v.
Giannattasio, 197 A.2d 342 (Conn. Super. 1963); Lovett v. Emory Univ., Inc., 156
S.E.2d 923 (Ga. App. 1967); Gile v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist., 296 P.2d 662 (Wash.
1956).
" Whitehurst v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 402 P.2d 584 (Ariz. 1965); Balkow-
itsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank Inc., 132 N.W.2d 805, (Minn. 1965);
Goelz v. J.K. & Susie L. Wadley Research Inst., 350 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961);
but see Carter v. Inter-Faith Hasp., 304 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1969).
"I At the present time all states except New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and
Vermont have enacted legislation to relieve hospitals and blood banks of strict liability
for the transfusion of blood contaminated with serum hepatitis virus. Of these, all but
nine define the procurement, processing, and distribution of blood and blood products
as a service. Comment, 3 FrA. ST. U.L. REv. 483, at 483 n.4 (1975).
"I' See generally Comment, 69 HARv. L. Rav. 391 (1955); Comment, 33 Miss. L.J.
253 (1962); Comment, 37 NoTRE DAME LAw. 565 (1962); Comment, 29 ST. JOHNS L. REV.
305 (1955). The sale-service distinction stems from the English Statute of Frauds
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Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc.,"0 decided in 1966,
was the first case to depart from the Perlmutter approach. The
plaintiff, in a suit against a blood bank, alleged that the blood
was sold by the blood bank as a separate transaction "complete
in itself and entirely apart from any services rendered" ' to her
by the hospital. The Florida court agreed that the transaction
was a sale and remarked that "[i]t seems to us a distortion to
take what is, at least arguably, a sale, twist it into the shape
of a service, and then employ this transformed material in
erecting the framework of a major policy decision.""' 2
The Perlmutter rationale was also rejected in Jackson v.
Muhlenberg Hospital,"3 which declared that "[t]he transfer of
human blood for a consideration is a sale. So is its transfusion
into the body of a patient when a charge is made for the
blood.""' 4 In that case the hospital purchased the blood from a
commercial blood bank for $18 per unit and charged the pa-
tient $25 per unit plus an additional $20 per unit for the trans-
fusion.
In Hoffman v. Misericordia Hospital'65 the Pennsylvania
court reversed the lower court's judgment for the defendant, a
hospital and community blood bank. The court rejected the
sales-versus-service analysis of Perlmutter and declared that it
was not required to determine the case on the technical exist-
ence of a sale. The court held that the complaint stated a valid
cause of action where it alleged. that the hospital sold blood to
the plaintiff for a consideration and that he subsequently died
as a result of contracting serum hepatitis from the blood.
The Perlmutter rationale should be rejected in Kentucky
insofar as the application of implied warranty liability is con-
cerned.'6' However, this would not necessarily settle the liabil-
which applied only to sales of goods worth 10 pounds or more. Note, Liability of a
Hospital for Supplying Impure Blood, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 374, 375.
z" 185 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967).
6 185 So. 2d at 750.
,62 Id. at 752.
66 232 A.2d 879 (N.J. Super 1967).
,, 232 A.2d at 884.
,65 267A.2d 867 (Pa. 1970).
,66 Even though KRS § 139.125 characterized the furnishing of blood for transfu-
sion as a service rather than a sale, the Court might still determine that an implied
warranty existed. Although statutory implied warranties are limited to sales transac-
tions, the Code is "not designed in any way to disturb those lines of case growth which
[Vol. 65
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ity question. While a consumer would hardly consider blood
containing serum hepatitis virus either merchantable or fit for
the purpose sold, ' several recent cases appear to hold that
suppliers of contaminated blood will not be held strictly liable
for breach of warranty if they can show that there was no way
to detect serum hepatitis virus in the blood.'68 Some commen-
tators maintain that this is inappropriate in a warranty ac-
tion ' since sellers have been held liable in nontransfusion
cases for undiscoverable defects. 7 ' The Kentucky Supreme
Court nevertheless took this position in the McMichael case,
declaring that strict liability in tort and liability for breach of
warranty were "expressions of a single basic policy as to liabil-
ity for defective products."''
C. Strict Liability in Tort
The plaintiff in McMichael also based his action on a
theory of strict liability in tort. According to section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, the seller of a product that is
defective, and thereby unreasonably dangerous, will be held
strictly liable to the consumer who is injured as a conse-
have recognized that warranties need not be confined either to sales contracts or to
the direct parties to such a contract." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313 Comment
2. See also Greenfield, Consumer Protection in Service Transactions-Implied War-
ranties and Strict Liability in Tort, 1974 UTAH L. REv. 661.
Courts have permitted recovery under an implied warranty theory in such hybrid
transactions as restaurant meals and beauty treatments. Kenower v. Hotel Statler C.,
124 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1942); Goetten v. Owl Drug Co., 59 P.2d 142 (Cal. 1936) (food
in restaurant); Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 258 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1969) (permanent wave
treatment); Yochem v. Gloria, Inc., 17 N.E.2d 731 (Ohio 1938). The UNIFORM COMMER-
CIL CODE § 2-314(1) now imposes liability under implied warranty for the serving of
contaminated or unwholesome food in restaurants. An extension of this principle to
blood transfusions seems reasonable. See generally Van Meveren, The Extension of
Liability to Service Contracts-Emphasizing the Furnishing of Unfit Blood for
Transfusion, 6 AM. Bus. L.J. 517 (1968).
U? Note, Hospital's Liability, supra note 135, at 578.
W" illiamson v. Memorial Hosp., 307 So. 2d 199 (Fla. App. 1975); Jackson v.
Muhlenberg Hosp., 232 A.2d 879 (N.H. Super 1967).
" Uniform Commercial Code Commentary, supra note 151, at 952-53.
'1 Veases v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 377 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1967); cf. Speed
Fasteners, Inc. v. Newsom, 382 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1967); Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labo-
ratories, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960); Marathon Battery v. Kilpatrick, 418 P.2d 900 (Okla.
1965).
M 532 S.W.2d at 11.
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quence."'7 Blood is a "product" within the meaning of § 402A
because it is intended for human consumption,"' and both hos-
pitals and blood banks, whether nonprofit organizations or
commercial enterprises, should be considered sellers for pur-
poses of liability since they are part of the distributive process
that transmits blood from the donor to the patient.'
Section 402A requires that the product be sold "in a defec-
tive condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or con-
sumer." Arguably, blood infected with hepatitis virus satisfies
this test.175 However, "unavoidably unsafe" products are not
treated as unreasonably dangerous and are thus outside the
scope of the strict liability doctrine. 7 Section 402A, comment
k, characterizes as unavoidably unsafe those products which
"in the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable
of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use." The
Kentucky Court based its decision in McMichael almost en-
tirely on this concept. In the Court's words: "[W]e have con-
cluded that under the stipulated facts of the instant case the
blood in question, in respect to the presence of hepatitis virus,
was unavoidably unsafe and thus was not unreasonably dan-
gerous nor unfit.'"7
In reaching this conclusion the Court relied on Jackson v.
Muhlenberg Hospital, 7 a 1967 New Jersey case, which denied
" See generally Annot., 13 A.L.R.3D 1057 (1967); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966); Wade, Strict Tort
Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965).
In RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment e (1965). Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial
Hosp. 266 N.E.2d 897, 899 (Ill. 1970).
"' RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment f (1965); Comment, Products Liability-
Hospitals Held Strictly Liable in Tort for the Transfusion of Hepatitis Infected
Blood, 2 Loy. CHI. L.J. 217, 223 (1971); Comment, 25 U. MIAMI L. REv. 349, 351-52
(1971); Comment, supra note 135, at 995-96. The Court refused to distinguish between
a blood bank and a hospital in this respect, holding that strict liability would apply
to anyone within the product's chain of distribution regardless of whether selling or
supplying that product was the defendant's principal business. Note, Strict Liability
for Disease Contracted from Blood Transfusion, 66 Nw. U.L. Rav. 80, 82 (1971).
1,5 Boland, Strict Liability in Tort for Transfusing Contaminated Blood, 23 ARK.
L. REv. 236, 243-45 (1969).
"' Comment, Serum Hepatitis Through Blood Transfusions: A Wrong Without a
Remedy?, 24 Sw. L.J. 305, 323 (1970).
'" 532 S.W.2d at 11.
' 232 A.2d 879 (N.J. Super. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 249 A.2d 65 (N.J.
1969).
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recovery under both implied warranty and strict liability theo-
ries. The court assumed that serum hepatitis virus was unde-
tectable and therefore considered the product unavoidably
unsafe. The Kentucky Court also discussed Brody v. Overlook
Hospital, '" another New Jersey case, which held that contami-
nated blood could be considered unavoidably unsafe and there-
fore not unreasonably dangerous.
McMichael, however, is contrary to Cunningham v. Mac-
Neal Memorial Hospital, "I which declared that blood contain-
ing serum hepatitis virus was unreasonably dangerous to the
user because of its impurity and did not fall within the un-
avoidably unsafe product exception.' 8' According to the
Cunningham court, the mere fact that there was no reliable
means to detect serum hepatitis virus in the blood was not
enough to characterize the product as unavoidably unsafe:
[W]hether or not defendant can, even theoretically, ascer-
tain the existence of serum hepatitus virus in whole blood
employed by it for transfusion purposes is of absolutely no
moment. Any other ruling would be entirely inconsistent with
the concept of strict tort liability.'82
While many commentators assert that blood contami-
nated with serum hepatitis virus falls within the comment k
exception,' 3 the Cunningham court was correct in deciding
that reliance on comment k in blood transfusion cases is impro-
per. Three elements should exist before a product is exempted
'7 317 A.2d 392 (N.J. Super 1974).
' 266 N.E.2d 897 (Ill. 1970).
'' Comment, supra note 155, at 492-93. Cunningham also held that comment k
was only applicable to products that were pure. Comment, 4 AxRON L. Rev. 225, 228
(1971), but this interpretation seems to be too narrow. Comment, 69 MICH. L. REv.
1172, 1182 (1971).
"I 266 N.E.2d at 903.
The following agree that comment k should apply: Haut & Alter, Blood
Transfusions-Strict Liability?, 43 ST. JOHNs L. REv. 557, 571 (1969); Prosser, The Fall
of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 32 AM. TRIAL LAwYERS J. 1, 10 (1968);
Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN.
L. Rev. 363, 367 (1965); Note, Homologous Serum Hepatitis-Products Liability in a
Quandary, 10 WAsHBtnR L.J. 77, 91 (1970); Note, Liability of a Hospital for Supplying
Impure Blood, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 374, 387; Comment, supra note 181, at 1181-83;
Comment, 24 VAND. L. REv. 645, 653 (1971). The following believe that comment k
should not apply: Boland, supra note 175, at 241-42; Note, supra note 144, at 216-17;
Comment, 16 N.Y.L.F. 957, 966 (1970).
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under comment k from § 402A's strict liability: (1) The prod-
uct at the time of sale must be incapable of being made safe
for its intended use; (2) the potential societal benefit must
outweigh its possible harm; and (3) the product must be one
that would not have been marketed (or would have been de-
layed in marketing) due to a fear of catastrophic damages
under a strict liability theory."8 4 Although contaminated blood
might meet the second of these three requirements, it does not
meet the first and third.
In the first place, with the development of the Australian
antigen test, it is doubtful that blood is presently incapable of
being made safe for its intended use."8 5 Furthermore, even if
serum hepatitis virus cannot be eliminated from blood with
absolute certainty, the risk of contamination can be dramati-
cally reduced if prospective donors are properly screened.
Thus, if adequate testing and screening procedures are utili-
tized, blood can be made reasonably, if not absolutely, safe.
Moreover, even if serum hepatitis virus cannot be detected
in the blood, it is unlikely that the imposition of strict liability
would seriously deter the suppliers of blood from marketing
their product. Blood is not like a new drug for which it may be
difficult to obtain insurance or to self-insure because the risk
of loss cannot be calculated accurately, thus discouraging its
development and marketing. '
D. Conclusion
As the Kentucky Supreme Court pointed out last year in
Embs v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company, ' the Restatement's
imposition of strict liability upon the manufacturers and sellers
of defective products is based on the concept of enterprise lia-
bility. ' According to the proponents of this principle, a prod-
uct's social costs, including those associated with personal inju-
ries, should be treated as a cost of production and placed on
those in the chain of distribution instead of being left to fall
11 Note,supra note 144 at 215-16.
' Boland, supra note 175, at 241-42.
"' Comment, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 403 414-15 (1971).
187 528 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Ky. 1975). See also Ausness, Kentucky Law Sur-
vey-Torts, 64 Ky. L.J. 201, 222-24 (1975).
Is RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment c (1965).
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upon the victims. ' The primary justification of enterprise
liability from the perspective of welfare economics is that it
encourages a more efficient allocation of resources in the
society.'90
Loss spreading is another justification for enterprise liabil-
ity. According to this rationale, losses caused by defective
products should be shifted to the manufacturer or supplier be-
cause he can best minimize their economic impact by spread-
ing them among a large number of consumers.'9 ' Both loss
spreading and resource allocation principles support the impo-
sition of strict liability in blood transfusion cases such as
McMichael.
Let us consider the loss-spreading issue first. As was men-
tioned earlier, the effects of serum hepatitis can be cata-
strophic. In addition to its painful symptoms, the disease fre-
quently causes substantial economic loss to its victims.' 2 In the
McMichael case, for example, the victim sustained more than
$7,000 in out-of-pocket expenses from the disease. '93 Admit-
"' 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 13.1 (1956); James, An Evaluation
of the Fault Concept, 32 TENN. L. REv. 394, 399-400 (1965); Klemme, The Enterprise
Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 153, 158-59 (1976).
'" The enterprise liability theory assumes that the market is generally the best
institutional device for allocating the resources of society. For the pricing mechanism
of the market to achieve the most efficient allocation of the community's total re-
sources, however, the market price of goods and services must reflect the full cost of
making them available. Therefore failure to internalize social costs such as personal
injuries caused by a product will distort consumer demand and induce society to
produce more of the product than necessary. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distri-
bution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 500-06 (1961).
"' Note, Strict Products Liability to the Bystander: A Study in Common Law
Determinism, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 625, 636 (1971). The case for loss-spreading rests on
the assumption that the imposition of a substantial cost on relatively few people is
more likely to cause greater social and economic dislocation (secondary losses) than
an equivalent cost imposed by taking a series of small sums for many people. G.
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 39-40 (1970); Feezer, Capacity to Bear Loss as a
Factor in the Decision of Certain Types of Tort Cases, 78 U. PA. L. REv. 805, 809-10
(1930).
112 One study estimated the average loss from serum hepatitis at (1) $1875 for
hospital and in-patient treatment costs; (2) $425 for home nursing; (3) $675 absence
from the labor market; and (4) $250 for out-patient medical treatment. The loss to the
victim or his family will average more than $20,000, however, in cases where the disease
results in death or permanent disability. Kessel, Transfused Blood, supra note 135, at
269.
" Appellant's Brief at 8, McMichael v. American Red Cross, 532 S.W.2d 7 (Ky.
1975).
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tedly, victims may shift some of these costs on a first party
basis through hospitalization and disability insurance pro-
grams.'94 Nevertheless, many "costs," such as pain and suffer-
ing, will not be spread if the victim is initially forced to bear
the consequences of serum hepatitis. In most cases hospitals
and blood banks are better loss-spreaders. Because the statisti-
cal risk of serum hepatitis contamination is known, '95 the sup-
pliers of blood should be able to obtain liability insurance (or
self-insure) and adjust the cost of the product accordingly." '
Perhaps this will cause an increase in the cost of blood'97 or
contribute to the general rise of medical costs.'98 However, the
cost to society from serum hepatitis remains the same, and is
merely shifted from a small class (victims) to a larger one (con-
sumers). Those who receive blood transfusions as a class are
better able to bear the social costs of serum hepatitis infection
than the actual victims."9
In addition, the imposition of strict liability in blood trans-
fusion cases may also lead to a more efficient allocation of
resources. 21 Considerations of economic efficiency support the
notion that losses caused by defective products should be
placed on the cheapest cost avoider-the party who can most
cheaply reduce or prevent them.21 In most instances the sup-
plier, rather than the victim, will be the cheapest cost avo-
ider.212 This seems to be the case with blood suppliers. Shifting
"I Note, Liability for Serum Hepatitis in Blood Transfusions, supra note 143, at
598.
,,5 Calabresi & Bass, Right Approach, Wrong Implications: A critique of McKean
on Products Liability, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 74, 83 (1970).
"' Comment, supra note 155, at 494. This is questioned, however, in Comment,
24 VAND. L. REv. 645, 654 (1971).
,, Note, supra note 143, at 596.
"' Comment, supra note 138, at 372.
", Note, supra note 144, at 212. If, as is later suggested, imposition of strict
liability on the suppliers of blood will significantly reduce the incidence of serum
hepatitis infection, the total amount of costs that must be spread will also be reduced,
and therefore the pro rata cost that each consumer must bear will be correspondingly
reduced. For this reason, a shift to strict liability will not necessarily lead to a dramatic
increase in the price of blood or in the general cost of medical services.
20 Calabresi & Bass, supra note 195, at 84.
20, Id. at 76-89.
2 See Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YAME
L.J. 1055, 1071-72 (1972); but see Buchanan, In Defense of Caveat Emptor, 38 U. CHI.
L. REv. 64, 67-70 (1970).
[Vol. 65
HeinOnline  -- 65 Ky. L.J. 332 1976-1977
KENTUCKY LAW SURVEY
the costs of contaminated blood from the victim to the supplier
would discourage unnecessary blood transfusions and would
provide a financial incentive to develop a more effective
method of detecting serum hepatitis virus in the blood.0 3 The
strict liability approach might also lead to the creation of blood
substitutes for clinical use. 4 More importantly, the imposition
of strict libility on hospitals and blood banks would have a
beneficial effect on donor selection and blood collection prac-
tices. An English commentator recently compared America's
system of blood collection and allocation with that of Great
Britain, which relies entirely on noncommercial donors, and
concluded that the commercial sector is largely responsible for
the existence of the hepatitis problem in the United States.0 '
It is well known that the rate of serum hepatitis contami-
nation from commercial sources is about 10 times greater than
that of blood from volunteer donors,00 a condition largely due
to the poor screening methods of commercial blood banks
which locate in central cities and attract drug users, alcoholics,
and others with much higher hepatitis infection rates than the
general population.2 ' Unquestionably, better screening of do-
nors could substantially reduce the incidence of serum hepati-
tis contamination in blood2 8 and hospitals and blood banks are
in a better position than victims to see that this is done.2 0 The
Brody v. Oberlook Hosp., 296 A.2d 668 (N.J. Super. 1972); Comment, 4 Sm'ON
HALL L. REv. 730, 742 (1973).
"I Comment, supra note 135, at 1010; see Sloviter, Erythrocyte Substitutes, 54
MED. CLN. N.A. 787 (May, 1970).
"I See generally R. Trrmuss, THE GiFr RELATIONSHIP: FROM HuMAN BLOOD TO So-
CILL POLIcY (1971); but see Solow, Book Review, 80 YALE L.J. 1696, 1705 (1971).
1 Note, supra note 144 at 196 n.1.
" Allen, Volunteer Blood for Everyone, 9 STAN. M.D. 2 (1970); Holder, Serum
Hepatitis, 6 LAWYERS MED. J. 79, 87 (1970).
"I Note, Liability for Blood Transfusion Injuries, 42 MINN. L. REv. 640, 655 (1958);
Comment, supra note 186, at 415.
Legislative action is also possible. The state could prohibit commercial blood
banks entirely as was done recently in Wisconsin. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.31(1) (Supp.
1971). However, not all paid donors are dangerous. Jennings,, Not all Paid Donors Pose
Hepatitis Risks, 2 LAB. MEDMINE 8 (July, 1971). Many European countries rely heavily
on commercial blood donors without experiencing a high incidence of serum hepatitis
contamination. R. TrrMuss, THE GIFr RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD To SocIAL
POLICY 174-75 (1971). Therefore the legislature should concentrate its attention on
high-risk categories of commercial donors. For example the use of prisoners, a high-
risk group, as blood donors might be banned or at least discouraged. Franklin,
Hepatitis, Blood Transfusions, and Public Action, 21 CATS. U.L. Rv. 683, 698 (1972).
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imposition of strict liability would encourage hospitals to ob-
tain blood from low-risk sources and give a competitive advan-
tage to those commercial suppliers who employ the most effec-
tive screening procedures. 21 1
The prospect of strict liability might also encourage hospi-
tals to obtain more blood from volunteer sources. 211 At the
present time, about 4.3 million units of blood annually are
provided from volunteer sources such as the Red Cross,212 while
commercial donors provide an additional 1.3 million units.213
While there are an estimated 100 million eligible donors in the
United States, only about 3 percent give blood each year.214
Hospitals could attract more volunteer donors by advertising,
by promoting the formation of group blood plans, and by en-
couraging patients to secure replacement donors instead of
relying on blood from commercial sources.215
So far in presenting the case for strict liability there has
been no distinction made between commercial and noncom-
mercial suppliers of blood. The defendant in the McMichael
case, the American Red Cross, was a noncommercial supplier.
Do the principles of enterprise liability discussed above also
support the imposition of strict liability on noncommercial
blood banks? The "efficiency" or "resource allocation" argu-
Legislation might discourage skid row derelicts from donating blood by prohibiting the
payment except in the form of a check mailed to the donor not less than 15 days after
the donation. See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590-3 § 3(6) (Vern. Supp. 1972)(since
repealed). Finally, blood donations by individuals might be induced by the use of
federal tax incentive devices. Franklin, supra.
20 Comment, 48 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 292, 297 (1971); Comment, 25 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 349, 353 (1971).
2I Volunteer donors include "altruistic" donors, assurance donors, and replace-
ment donors. Assurance donors contribute annually to a blood bank, often under a
group blood plan, in return for the right to draw blood if needed for themselves or their
families during the following year. The replacement donor donates blood on behalf of
someone, usually a friend or relative, who has already received a transfusion. Franklin,
supra note 209.
212 NAT'L AcAD. OF SCIENCE, NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, AN EVALUATION OF THE UTILIZATION
OF HUMAN BLOOD RESOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES 21 (1970). The Red Cross provides
about three million units of this blood. It should be noted, however, that the Red Cross
sometimes uses paid donors. NAT'L HEART & LUNG INST., BLOOD REsouRcEs STUDIES
SUMMARY REPORT 134 (H.E.W., NIH 73-416, June 30, 1972).
213 Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis: An Analysis and a Proposal, 24 STAN.
L. REV. 439, 441 (1972).
211 Note, Strict Liability, supra note 174, at 80.
215 Comment, supra note 155, at 494-95.
[Vol. 65
HeinOnline  -- 65 Ky. L.J. 334 1976-1977
KENTUCKY LAW SURVEY
ment is admittedly weak insofar as noncommercial blood
banks are concerned. The prospect of strict liability might en-
courage these institutions to support more research into serum
hepatitis detection methods, but it will have little impact on
donor selection practices since most noncommercial blood
banks already use low-risk volunteers. However, the noncom-
mercial status of the supplier does not make much difference
as far as the risk-spreading rationale is concerned. Noncom-
mercial blood banks are still better loss-spreaders than individ-
ual hepatitis victims. Because of their low-risk status they
should be able to spread the costs of serum hepatitis infection,
either directly or by means of insurance, among all their blood
transfusion recipients.
Accordingly, the Kentucky Supreme Court in McMichael
should have determined that the transaction in question gave
rise to an implied warranty of merchantability and also fell
within the scope of § 402A even though serum hepatitis virus
could not be detected in the blood.
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